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• We study a major reform in the Australian military’s retirement plan.
• A 20-year cliff-vesting plan is substituted by a new one-year vesting plan.
• Most observed individuals choose the one-year vesting retirement plan.
• Removing the 20-year cliff-vesting considerably increases attrition rates.
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a b s t r a c t
We study the retention effects of the Australian military’s decision to remove a 20-year cliff-vesting
requirement from their retirement system in 1991.We follow to the present individualswho self-selected
into and out of the 20-year cliff-vesting plan, as well as thosewhowere forced out of the plan. Eliminating
the high years of service cliff-vesting provision leads to consistently higher attrition over time.
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This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
One of the main criticisms of traditional retirement systems is
the delayed vesting of retirement benefits, whereby no benefits are
received if the employee separates before the vesting date and full
benefits are received for retirement after the vesting date (Lazear,
1990). Vesting periods of up to 20 years have been the traditional
norm for many public service organizations across the world (Dis-
ney and Johnson, 2001). Such ‘‘cliff-vesting’’ retirement systems
are often regarded as unfair for employees who leave before the
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ployers (Warner, 2008).
While earlier vesting periods are gaining popularity, many pub-
lic service retirement plans still vest at high years-of-service (YOS).
For example, the USmilitary –which employs over onemillion ser-
vice members – still has a 20 YOS vesting period. In this paper, we
provide what is to our knowledge the first empirical evidence on
the retention effects of removing the cliff-vesting component of a
public sector retirement system—useful information for organiza-
tions interested in removing high YOS vesting requirements.
We study a major retirement reform undertaken by the Aus-
tralian Defence Force (ADF) in 1991 in which a 20 YOS cliff-vesting
retirement scheme was replaced by one with a one-year vest. (The
plans differed in other dimensions as well, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2, but the removal of the 20 YOS vest was by far the most
salient). A crucial consideration for any employer when changing
a retirement plan is whether current employees will be ‘‘grandfa-
thered’’ into the old retirement system. Out of a sense of fairness,
C-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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either the new or the old plan. All service members hired on Octo-
ber 1, 1991 or after were automatically enrolled in the new plan.
Comparing those who chose to stay on the old plan with those
on the new plan, we show that facing a 20-year cliff-vest sig-
nificantly reduced attrition before the vesting period. Comparing
those who self-selected into the new plan with those who were
enrolled in it automatically, we find similar attrition profiles which
suggests that there was not much of a selection effect amongst the
choice cohort in terms of retention probability, separate from the
effect of the plan itself.
This paper adds to the small empirical literature on retirement
reform in the military (e.g., Simon et al., forthcoming; Cunha and
Menichini, 2014), and our results are in line with the simulation
exercises in Ausink and Wise (1996) and Asch et al. (2013).
2. The retirement programs
We briefly describe the ADF retirement programs; for full
details refer to Cole et al. (1990).
DFRDB. The Australian Defence Force Retirement and Death
Benefits (DFRDB), introduced in 1972, is a defined benefit pension
plan with a 20 YOS cliff-vest. Members retiring with 20 or more
YOS are entitled to a pension equal to a percentage of their final
pay; the percentage depends on total YOS, ranging from 35 for 20
YOS to 76.5 for 40 YOS or more. Those who leave service with less
than 20 YOS do not receive a pension, yet have a ‘‘soft landing’’ in
the form of a lump-sum payment calculated as the sum of 5.5% of
each year’s annual pay for the entirety of their tenure. As this lump
sum amount does not include interest or adjustments for inflation,
there is still a very large discontinuity in the present value of the
retirement package at the 20 YOS mark.
MSBS. In order to address perceived inequities under DFRDB,
the ADF created the Military Superannuation and Benefits Scheme
(MSBS) and automatically enrolled all members who entered ser-
vice on or after October 1, 1991. The MSBS has both defined bene-
fit and defined contribution components. Importantly, it does not
have a cliff-vest; rather, all members receive retirement payments
upon reaching retirement age (55 years for those born before July
1960 and increasing by one year until those born after June 1964).
The defined benefit is a function of the member’s YOS and their
final three-year-average salary, and is taken as a pension or a
lump sum payout at retirement age. The defined contribution is
a mandatory 5% of the member’s annual pay, invested in a menu
of government-managed funds; it cannot be withdrawn before re-
tirement age.
Compared to DFRDB, MSBS is far more beneficial for those with
less than 20 YOS and is slightly more beneficial for those who stay
longer than 25 years. For those planning on retiring with between
20 and 25 YOS, uncertain future returns on government-managed
funds would have made it difficult to determine which plan was
more beneficial.1
The transition period. All members under DFRDB had to make
the choice between DFRDB and MSBS by September 30, 1992.
3. Data
We use individual-level administrative data from the ADF on
all new enlisted service members and officers from September 1,
1990 until September 30, 1992. Thus, we observe one cohort who
enlisted between September 1, 1990 and September 30, 1991 and
1 A financial comparison between DFRDB and MSBS for a representative enlisted
member is available in the Online Appendix.Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the sample, by cohort.
Choice cohort (FY1991) No choice cohort (FY1992)
(1) (2)
Chose MSBS 0.863
(0.005)
Male 0.812 0.827
(0.006) (0.009)
Age at enlistment 20.066 19.998
(0.049) (0.075)
Officer 0.138 0.233
(0.005) (0.010)
Army 0.520 0.272
(0.007) (0.011)
Navy 0.223 0.436
(0.006) (0.012)
Air Force 0.257 0.292
(0.006) (0.011)
Observations 4586 1758
had a choice between DFRDB and MSBS – the FY1991 cohort –
and another cohort who enlisted between October 1, 1991 and
September 30, 1992, and were automatically enrolled in MSBS—
the FY1992 cohort.
Two issues with this sample are of note: first, data on the re-
mainder of the force in FY1991 is not available due to limited elec-
tronic record keeping at that time, which limits the scope of our
analysis. Second, amongst the cohorts we do observe, retirement
choice data are missing for those who left the military prior to July
1, 1994, again due to incomplete record keeping. This missing data
could bias our estimates if there is differential attrition amongst
those who chose different retirement schemes. While we do not
have the data necessary to assess the extent of any potential bias
(e.g., detailed demographic characteristics of choosers), it is rea-
sonable to believe that the retirement scheme is a small compo-
nent of an individual’s choice to continue employment within the
first three years of their career.
Table 1 contains summary statistics, by cohort, of the 6344
individuals in our sample. Amongst the choice cohort, 86.3% chose
MSBS—a take-up rate in line with military leadership’s predictions
at the time. Over 80% of each cohort is male and the mean age
at enlistment is about 20 years. Given the relatively small size of
the ADF, the variations we see across cohorts in the percentage of
officers and the branch of service are to be expected.
4. Analysis and results
We first explore the covariates of the retirement choice within
the FY1991 choice cohort. Table 2 contains estimates from a linear
probabilitymodel of choosingMSBS over DFRDB on the observable
covariates for the whole sample, and for officers and enlisted
personnel separately.
Theoretically, the choice between a high and low YOS cliff-vest
is influenced by time preference and risk-aversion. As mentioned
above, the present value of MSBS surpasses DFRDB for those who
stay past 25 YOS. Given that officers are more likely in general to
stay in the ADF longer, it is not surprising that officers were 7.7
percentage points more likely to choose MSBS than enlisted per-
sonnel. Females are more likely to leave the labor force in gen-
eral to bear and raise children, and we find that females – enlisted
more so than officers – are more likely to choose MSBS, the more
flexible option. Age at the time of enlistment is positively associ-
ated with the propensity to choose MSBS, albeit with small eco-
nomic significance. Navy and Air Force members were more likely
than Armymembers to chooseMSBS: anecdotal evidence suggests
that informal informational campaigns at the time of the choice
were service specific, but we do not have data onwhat information
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The covariates of the MSBS/DFRDB choice.
Sample= All Officers Enlisted
Outcome= Chose MSBS Chose MSBS Chose MSBS
(1) (2) (3)
Officer 0.077***
(0.014)
Male −0.102*** −0.038 −0.112***
(0.013) (0.026) (0.014)
Age at enlistment 0.003* 0.002 0.003*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Navy 0.060*** 0.049* 0.062***
(0.013) (0.026) (0.014)
Air Force 0.119*** 0.059*** 0.132***
(0.012) (0.022) (0.014)
Observations 4586 633 3953
R-squared 0.045 0.019 0.042
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The omitted category is Army.
* p < 0.1.
*** p < 0.01.
was provided by the different branches. Overall, the correlates in
Table 2 are consistent with what we observe in the context of an
important, albeit different, retirement choice amongst US military
service members (Cunha and Menichini, 2014; Simon et al., forth-
coming).
We next turn to ourmain analysis. Fig. 1 contains Kaplan–Meier
survival estimates for the entire sample (Panel A) and for officers
and enlisted separately (Panels B and C, respectively). The initial
flat portion of the curves reflects the missing observations of those
who separated before 4 YOS. In all groups, the curves begin to fall
with a high slope (i.e., a high separation rate) until approximately
10 YOS, when the curves gradually flatten out. In general, this
behavior is expected as individuals either select out of or settle into
their military career.2
Several main points are of note. First, the attrition rate under
MSBS is higher than that under DFRDB in every year of the sam-
ple except at 20 YOS. Second, the separation probability becomes
extremely small for those under DFRDB after about 15 YOS—this
is the lock-in effect of the high YOS cliff-vesting requirement. On
the contrary, survival curves under the twoMSBS samples continue
to fall during the whole period. Third, the survival curves for the
choice and non-choice MSBS samples are relatively close to each
other, which suggests that there was not much of a selection effect
amongst the FY1991 choice cohort in terms of retention probabil-
ity, separate from the effect of the plan itself.
All three panels show large attrition rates at 20 YOS for those
who chose DFRDB, which is expected as they have now vested and
face a high opportunity cost of staying. Finally, while officers in
general stay in the force longer than enlisted personnel, the overall
shape of the survival curves are similar. These findings are consis-
tent with the simulation results of removing the 20 YOS cliff-vest
requirement in the US military by Asch et al. (2013).
5. Conclusion
Our findings show that the removal of a high YOS cliff-vest had
important consequences for personnel retention in the Australian
military. An important open question is whether the removal of
high YOS cliff-vests induces differential retention by employee
2 Pairwise Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests show the distributions of YOS are strongly
significantly different across all groups.Fig. 1. Kaplan–Meier survival estimates.
quality. Given the current pressures in other public sector contexts
to remove 20-year vesting period (e.g., the US military), further
research in this direction is needed.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.005.
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